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IN THE SUPRE11E COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT THORNOCK, )
\'/ILLA LUCILLE THORNOCK KENNEDY,)
ADEN KAY THORNOCK, JOHN RUSSELL)
THORNOCK, and LOIS ANN THORNOCK)
BRO\'/N, the Determined Heirs of )
ADEN l'IOODRUFF THORNOCK,
)
)

Plaintiffs and Respondents

)
)

vs.

)
)

LOIS S. COOK

)
)

Defendant and Appellant

)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to quiet title to mineral rights in
certain real property located in Rich County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Rich County granted a Default
Certificate against all defendants

exce~t

Appellant LOIS S. COOK,

who alone appeared and answered; granted Summary Judgment for
Plaintiffs upon Plaintiff's Motion; and issued a Decree of Quiet
Title confirming title to the disputed mineral rights in plain~
tiffs.

From this Sul1\1'1ary Judgment and Decree, Defendant LOIS S.

COOK appealed.

The Supreme court affirmed the Judgment and Decree,

and Defendant petitions for rehearing.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON

A~PEAL

Appellant seeks reversal of the Su!T\I'lary Judgment be\.c~·I

and a remand to the District Court for a trial by jury on:-:
merits.

STATEI-lENT OF FACTS

Appellant refers to and incorporates herein by referen:!

i
the Statement set forth in Appellant's Brief on this Appeal.'
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY,

IF ANY AMBIGUITIES AND

INCONSISTENCIES ARE RESOLVED IN HER FAVOR BY VIEWING THE TESTIMONY
IN T:IE LIGHT !10ST FAVORABLE TO HER, AFFORDS EVIDENCE OF DURESS
AND COERCION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE 1959 QUITCLAIM DEED WHICH PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Summary judgment is only in order where there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

When such a

motion against a defendant is made, it may .be granted only if the
undisputed facts establish that he has no defense:
On a motion for sul'Ul\ary judgment against
a defendant, where some of the facts are
in dispute, a judgment can properly be
rendered against a defendant only if, on
the undisputed facts, the defendant has
no valid defense; if then any material
fact asserted by the plaintiff is contradicted by the defendant, the facts as
stated by the defendant must, on such
motion, be taken as true.
Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrixson,
9 Utah2d 152, 154, 340 P. 2d 416 (1959).
The judgment can be given only if there is no dispute on a
material evidentiary matter.
(Utah 1974).

Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620, 62l

There is to be no weighing of evidence or evaluation

of credibility of witnesses:

"The court cannot consider the weight
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of testimony or the credibility of witnesses in considering,
motion for summary judgment."
292, 294, 431 P.2d 126

(1967).

Singleton v. Alexander, 19 CU.
As stated in Holbrook Co."·:

542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975):
It is not the purpose of the sUJTlITlary
judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the avernents of parties, or
witnesses, or the weight of evidence.
Neither is it to deny parties the right
to a trial to resolve disputed issues of
fact.
Its purpose is to eliminate the
time, trouble and expense of trial when
upon any view taken of the facts as
asserted by the party ruled against, he
would not be entitled to prevail. Only
when it so appears, is the court justified
in refusing such a party the opportunity
of presenting his evidence and attempting
to persuade the fact trier to his views.
Conversely, if there is any dispute as to
any issue, material to the settlement of
the controversy, the surIDary judgment
should not be granted.
As discussed more fully in reviewing the evidence below,:
triable issue of fact raised by the defendant's amended answe:
It

which is at issue in this phase of the case is duress.

is

the defendant's position that if she and her husband quitclai;o
mineral rights to Aden Thornock in 1959 they did so under du:e'
Her sta.te of mind and that of her husband are consequently er.:
issues:

If they unwillingly executed the deed because their·;:

.
. voi· d and his s.
were overborne by Thornock's harassnent, it is
sors cannot claim anything thereunder.

In deterriining whethe:

conveyance is procured by duress, the grantor's physical

a~"

' t

'

state may be considered as bearing upon his \'/ill to resis ...
Johnson
v.LibraryJohns~,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Library.
Funding for digitization
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44, 337 P.2d 420

(1959).

Thus both the circumstances of the

exeuction of the conveyance and the personal attributes of the
grantor enter into a determination of duress, and both these
circumstances are matters of fact.

But summary judgment is not

usually appropriate where the issue raised concerns a subjective
state of mind.

Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967

(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967). Summary
judgment is particularly inappropriate where, as here, the issue
involved is the defendant's state of mind.

Ross v. John's Bargain

Stores Corp., 464 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1972).

The perusal

of transcribed deposition testimony at second-hand is insufficient
basis for deciding whether this deed was the product of the genuine free will of the grantors or of the continous "hounding" by
the grantee--at least where, as here, the surviving grantor
asserts that their will was overborne and further testifies to
a pattern of harassment which compelled them to sign the deed
in order to be left in peace.
Where there has been a motion for summary judgment, the
burden of proof is on the moving party.

Revlon, Inc. v. Regal

Pharmacy, Inc., 29 F.R.D. 169, 171 (E.D. Mich. 1961). The moving
party has the heavy burden of positively and clearly demonstrating
that there is no genuine issue of fact, and any doubt as to the
existence of such an issue is resolved against him.

National

Screen Service Corp. v. Poster Exchange, Inc., 305 F.2d 647, 651
(5th Cir. 1962). Even if the nonmoving party comes forth with
nothing, summary judgment must be denied if the facts supporting
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the motion do not establish the nonexistence of a genuine fac: ,
issue.

Bloomgarden v. Coyer,

479 F.2d

201, 2_06-07 (D.c. c,'

1973). Since the deposition testimony of the defendant, Mrs,[I
does furnish some evidence of duress and coercion
,
, the exec.·.. I
in
of the quitclaim deed under which plaintiffs assert their cloi:
summary judgment should not have been granted.
Even at this juncture of the case, on appeal, the defend 2::
against whom summary judgment has been rendered is entitled tc
have this Court survey the evidence, and all inferences reasori
to be drawn from it, in the light mostfavorable to her.

White!

v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah2d 81, 82, 395 P.2d 918 (1964); Tho::;
_

I

Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah2d 30, 31-32, 395 P. 2d 62 (1964).

r:I

purposes of appeal from summary judgment in favor of the plrn:!
the defendant's version of facts will be accepted as true.!'.'.£

v. First National Bank of Anchorage, 584 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Alas:
1978).

If there is the slightest doubt as to the material fac:

,
Gra'' I
the judgment will be reversed for a trial on the merits. _:;'

Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. James, 118 Ariz. 116, ll8,

315

(1978).

Thus, apparent contradictions or ambiguities in:'

Cook's deposition testimony, if the Court perceives any, shou!'
be resolved in her favor.

Not only is that the

recogni~d

of review, it also reflects the psychological reality

oft~
'!'''

situation if the court takes into account the personal fral"'
.
.
rnstances'
of Mrs. Cook and the unfamiliar and threatening circu
~'

:

which she underwent her first experience of being deposed.,,.
this cour:
cussed further below, the trial court concluded and
cook's aeposiu:r
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has hitherto agreed that the d:fendant Mrs.

I

testimony does not prove her claim of duress and coercion in
the execution of the 1959 quitclaim deed.

That may be a reading

of the evidence which a factfinder could properly arrive at. But
such a determination necessarily involves the weighing of evidence,
the crediting of certain statements and the discounting cf others,
and a judgment about the witness's credibility.

For purposes

of summary judgment, however, evidence may not be weighed nor
credibility considered.
jury.

Those functions properly belong to the

The fact, if it is a fact, that the party against whom

the motion is made is unlikely to prevail at trial is not sufficient to authorize summary judgment against him.

National Screen

Service Corp. v. Poster Exchange, Inc., supra, 305 F.2d at 651.
This Court should reconsider its judgment and reverse the trial
court, not because its evaluation of the evidence is necessarily
an unreasonable one, but because that kind of evaluation exceeds
the narrow range of considerations justifying summary judgment.
It appears from the text of this Court's opinion that its
conclusion that there is no genuine fact issue respecting the
duress issue rests wholly on its interpretation of Mrs. Cook's
own deposition testimony.

There is no other evidence as yet

adduced relating to the circumstances in which the 1959 quitclaim
deed was executed.

Thus the closest scrutiny of this testimony

is called for, bearing in mind that it is to be viewed in a manner
most favorable to Mrs. Cook.
Mrs. cook is an elderly widow, without business experience,
who relied on her husband to handle business matters (Dep. 1, 16, 17) •
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She is legally unsophisticated.
before (Dep.

She had never been deposed

3), she had difficulty understanding many of

the questions -- including those inquiring about "duress" an,:'
"coercion"
is

(Dep.

(Dep.

52)

-- and was not even sure what a "defend;·

58), although that is her role in this case.

confused by the proceeding (Dep.

7).

She•,:::

Counsel for the plaint!'

took advantage of her age and inexperience and badgered her:;
repeating questions which she was unable to answer, often as:!:
them five,

six or even more times.

(E.g., Dep.

24).

The

in~:

I

gation related to events occurring almost 20 years ago, whicn.'
as Mrs. Cook observed, "a long ways back"

( Dep. 10) .

Not sun:

singly she was unable to recollect many details, a circurnstar.: 1
seized upon by plaintiffs' counsel to impugn her honesty and
threaten her with legal sanctions.

One of these attorneys g:'

tui tously threatened her with sanctions unless she agreed oi:
spot to ascertain and disclose her checking account n~b~tt
at a later time

(Dep.

41), and repeated his threat a little k

had "sat
The same attorney charged that Mrs. Cook
lied un~:: 1
during the last hour and consciously and maliciously
(Dep. 46).

oath for the sale purpose of obfuscating the truth" (Dep.

411

'

Mrs. Cook did not recollect very much of the 1959 transac:
but she testified straightforwardly that Aden Thornock procur'
eated
the execution of the deed, if at all, by constantly re P
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demands upon each of the Cooks until their resistance was
worn down.

She was not sure if she signed the deed at all

(Dep. 6); she knew only that she had signed "some papers"
because "Mr. Thornock was after us continually"
also

Dep. 10 and passim).

(Dep. B; see

As she put it:

He hounded us continually.
He just was at us
continually.
He never gave us any peace.
When we stepped out the door, he was there,
and I thought when we bought the house, we
bought everything (Dep. 9).
Her understanding had always been that she and her husband bought
the property "and all that went with it."

(Dep. 17).

She said

Thornock didn't threaten her "with physical violence," but
plaintiff's counsel did not pursue the matter when she did not
directly answer a question whether legal or other threats were
made against her (Dep. 21).

Thornock did contact each of the

Cooks separately and repeatedly to get them to sign (Dep. 56) .
Toward the end of the deposition, after the aforementioned threats
were made, she did say that no one forced, threatened or coerced her
(Dep. 51), but this answer is hardly decisive under the circumstances, especially since it immediately came out that she did not
know what "duress" and "coercion" meant in any event (Dep. 52).

If

viewed in the light most favorable to her, the defendant's testimony was such that a trier of fact could find that, even absent
explicit threats or overt violence, the Cook's consent to execution
of the quitclaim deed was procured by incessant harrassment at
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their home by Aden Thornock until the Cooks agreed to sign,
as Mrs. Cook testified, quoting her husband, to "get him off
our back"

(Dep.

29).

That is all the defendant maintains at

this juncture of the case.

But that is enought to preclude

summary judgment as to the duress issue.
Mrs. Cook made some statements that may tend to be adverSi
to her in answer to harrassing and conclusory questions whose
import was unclear to her.

i

The defendant does not take the

position that the plaintiffs are not entitled at trial to make
use of this testimony, to the extent consonant with the rules~
of evidence, to be accorded such weight as seems appropriate::
the jury.

By the same token, the defendant would be entitled

to explain her answers, to introduce other answers from her

ti'

mony which sustain her position, and to show the circumstanced
which the testimony was taken.

But the defendant does emphatl

insist that the weighing of evidence, the resolution of conflil
and the assessment of credibility are matters peculiarly with:·r
the province of the factfinder.

These functions cannot proper

be discharged by either a trial court or an appellate court
At trial, Mrs. cook will I
, I
interrogation'
the protection of an independent judge an d any
and cont!
takes place will be subject to the rules of evidence

working from the cold record alone.

I
:

by the court.
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Neither the trial court nor this Court was present when
Mrs. Cook testified, and the record is barren of evidence
of her bearing and demeanor and the manner in which she delivered
her testimony.

These intangible but important aspects of

determining credibility will clearly be crucial, upon the trial
of this case, to the resolution of the duress issue.
resolved adversely to the defendant.

It may be

But where such considera-

tions properly enter into the factfinder's determination, as here,
summary judgment is premature and inappropriate.

"Summary

judgment is not proper when an issue turns on credibility."
Eagle v. Louisiana & Southern Life Insurance Co., 464 F.2d 607,
608 (10th Cir.

1972).

Such is the situation here.

Where any arguable issue of duress or coercion is in issue,

")"

this Court has shown itself to be adverse to efforts to abort

:I

exploration of the issue at trial by way of summary judgment.
In Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance
Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah2d 211, 213, 398 P.2d 685 (1965), in
an opinion authored by Chief Justice Crockett, the Court reversed
the entry of swnmary judgment for defendant insurer where its

11

insured alleged that a settlement and release was obtained by

,1

fraud and duress.

1

The plaintiff claimed he was coerced into

executing the release as to one claim because the adjuster told
him he could not be paid on a second and related claim unless
he signed.

16 utah2d at 214.

It was enough for the Court to
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justify its reversal of surrunary judgment that if the facts
were entirely as the insured claimed that -- not that, in
fact, he was entitled to relief from settlement -- but that r.;
"may well" be so entitled:
If we accept the facts as plaintiff contends
them to be, as we are obliged to do on this
review, we must assume not only that the
plaintiff was in economic distress, but that
the defendant knew this and took advantage of
him by falsely representing that money
belonging to the plaintiff could not be
delivered to him, and wrongfully refusing to
deliver it unless plaintiff would also accept
the proffered settlement on defendant's
policy, which resulted in compelling plaintiff
to accept the latter settlement against his
will.
If found to be true, this false
representation, coupled with the wrongful
withholding of that which belonged to plaintiff,
may well justify a finding of duress which would
afford him relief from the settlement.
16 Utah2d at 215.

(footnotes omitted).

In holding that summary disposition was unwarranted, the
Court set forth the rationale for a standard of review by whic
doubts are resolved in favor of trial by jury:
The summary disposal of a case serves a
salutary purpose in avoiding time, tro~b~e
and expense of a trial when it is justified.
But unless it is clearly so, there are other
evils to be guarded against. A party with
a legitimate cause, but who is unable to
afford an appeal may be turned away without
his day in court; or, when an appeal is taken,
if a reversal results and a trial court is
ordered, the time, trouble and expense is
increased rather than diminished.
It is.to
avoid these evils and to safeguard the right
of access to the courts for the enforcement
of rights and the remedy of wrongs by a tri~l,
and by a jury if desired, that it is of sue
importance that the court should take care to
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see that the party adversely affected has
a fair opportunity to present his contentions
against precipitate action which will deprive
him of that privilege.
His contentions as to
the facts should be considered in the light
most favorable to him, and only if it clearly
appears that he could not establish a right
to recovery under the law should such action
be taken; and any doubts which exist should
be resolved in favor of affording him the
privilege of a trial.
Upon the consideration of the record it has
come to us we cannot conclude with such certainty
as to justify ruling as a matter of law that
there was no duress and/or fraud practiced upon
the plaintiff in obtaining the release in question.
Accordingly, it is necessary that the cause be
remanded for trial.
16 Utah2d at 216-17.

(footnotes omitted).

In the instant case, it is enough to preclude summary judgment
if Mrs. Cook's story of unceasing harrassment of both her husband
and herself caused them to execute the quitclaim deed to be rid
of Aden Thornock's importunities.

Whether the harassment was of

such effect as to amount to duress and coercion is a question for
the jury, taking into account the personalities and circumstances
of the parties and the meaning they attributed to their act.
Cases in which the underlying issue is one of motive, intent, or
other subjective fact are particularly inappropriate for summary
judgment, as are those in which the issue turns on credibility.
Conrad v. Delta Airlines, rnc., 494 F.2d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 1974) ·
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Since this case implicates both these considerations, it is
doubly inappropriate for resolution by the drastic and
final disposition of summary judgment.

'
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.

POINT II

PLAINTIFFS AS MOVING PARTY DID NOT SPECIFY
THE FACTS SUPPOSEDLY ESTABLISHING A PRIOR
SEVERANCE OF SURFACE AND MINERAL ESTATES
SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF
ADVERSE POSSESSION, AND ON THE FACTS PRESENTED
BY THE RECORD THE RULE RELATING TO SEVERANCE
IS INAPPLICABLE.
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As noted under Point I above, the burden is on the
moving party to justify sununary judgment in his favor.

One

aspect of this burden is a basic obligation to relate the
legal arguments to the record evidence on which the moving
party proposes to rely.

The opposing party should not have

to speculate about the factual underpinnings of the moving
party's conclusory assertions, nor should the opposing party
have to do the moving party's job for him by anticipating and
refuting every imaginable use which might conceivably be made
of the evidence in the record.

Courts disapprove the practice

"of dumping an extensive record on a busy trial judge without
guidance from counsel, expecting him to ferret out facts whic'·
might conceivably be relevant on a motion for summary judgmep:
American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F. 2d 1043, 1056 n.
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,

421 U.S. 1000 (1975).

If there

was any severance of surface and mineral estates in this case
might have occurred at any of many different times and ina
variety of different ways.

Severance may be effected by deei

or by reservation or by adverse possession.

Broadhurst_':'.!.

American Colloid Co., 177 N.W.2d 261, 265 (S.D. 1970).

What

transaction or occurrence the plaintiffs rely on as constiti;:
; le and the recor':
a severance cannot be determined f rom th e f ~
in their present state.

unless and until they identify the
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supposed severance with specificity, sununary judgment in their
favor is, to say the least, premature.
A close examination of the proceedings before the trial
court reveals that the plaintiffs never discharged their duty
to articulate a proper basis for summary judgment as to the
adverse possession claim, viz., prior severance of the mineral
and surface estates, and to identify with specificity the
undisputed evidence showing as a matter of law that severance
took place.

Plaintiffs' motion for sununary judgment of April 3,

1978, was based on the grounds (1) that record title was in the
plaintiffs;

(2)

that the defendant in her deposition testimony

admitted she knew of no facts contradicting plaintiffs' record
title; and (3)

that the defendant admitted knowing of no facts

sufficient to "reform, modify or rescind" the 1959 quitclaim
conveyance."

(The latter ground, relating to the quitclaim deed

as an independent basis of plaintiffs' claims as discussed under
Point I above, is for present purposes irrelevant.)

Thus, the

stated grounds of the motion, relating as they do solely to
record title, are irrelevant to any claim by the defendant based
on extrinsic circumstances outside the sequence of conveyances
such as title obtained prescriptively by adverse possession.
However, the defendant's amended answer and counterclaim filed
two days later, on April 5, 1978, asserted the defendant's claim
to the surface estate and its attendant mineral rights based on
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adv~rse possession.

The plaintiffs never amended their

motion to reflect the introduction of this new issue.

Thus,

the motion for summary judgment which the trial court gr ante:
does not even purport to state grounds alleging that there i;
no genuine fact issue as to adverse possession and that the
plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as against that claim as
a matter of law.
Despite this seemingly fatal oversight, the plaintiffs'
brief in support of their motion went beyond the grounds addu
in the motion itself by briefly disputing the adverse posses2.
claim (at page 34).

Ci ting Kanawha

&

Hocking Coal

&

Coke Co.

Carbon County, 535 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1975), plaintiffs arguedt·
assuming a severance of the mineral and surface estates, adv:·
possession of the surface estate is not adverse possess~n~
minerals.
a case:

But a fact issue cannot be eliminated just by cit;:
Citation of authority "do[es] not supplant on a moll·

for summary judgment the need for presentation of facts justil
the granting thereof."

Orange National Bank of Orange ~

Louisiana in New Orleans,

382 F. 2d 945, 949

(5th Cir. 196?).

Neither the brief nor any other paper ever filed by the
plaintiffs explained how or when the supposi tious severance c
curred.

Instead, the brief simply asserts a lega 1 co

19
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nclusio·

"The mineral estate was effectively severed long before
Defendant Cooks acquired possession of the subject property."
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, statements which
are legal conclusions rather than allegations of fact are
disregarded.

Welles v. Sauber, 142 F. Supp.

449, 451 (N.D. Ill.

1956); Chi-Mil Corp. v. W.T. Grant Co., 70 F.R.D. 352, 358 (E.D.
Wis. 1976).
The plaintiffs never timely and sufficiently specified what
facts their legal conclusion was based upon, nor did they establish
as they were obliged to, that there was no genuine issue as to
those facts or that those facts entitled them to judgment as a
matter of law.
In the present procedural posture of the case, the conclusion
is inescapable that triable issues of fact exist with respect to
the defendant's claim to title to the minerals by adverse
possession.

The defendant is in possession of the surface estate,

and her claim to have adversely possessed the surface estate has
never been controverted.

Adverse possession of the surface estate

extends to the underlying minerals.
2d 864, 899,

442 P.2d 692 (1968).

Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal.
Prior to the severance of

subsurface rights, possession of the surface implies possession
of the minerals below; when title to the surface passes by adverse
possession, so does the mineral estate.
Trustees,

Sachs v. Board of

89 N.M. 712, 721, 557 P.2d 209 (1976); 3 Arn. Jur.2d
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"Adverse Possession" § 216 (1962); Annot., "Acquisition
of Title of Mines or Minerals By Adverse Possession," 35
A.L.R.2d 124, 129

(1954).

But until severance, minerals in

and under land are a part thereof.

Broadhurst v. American

Colloid Co., supra, 177 N.W.2d at 265.

Thus, the presumptk

this point must be that the defendant as adverse possessor o'
the surface likewise has title to the minerals.

This presur.;

tion is rebuttable -- but it is up to the plaintiffs to rebut
This they have never explicitly done.
The Cooks went into possession of the land in question i:.
1952.
,.,

Any severance would have had to have occurred prior to

their taking possession.
697, 700 {Okla. App.

See, e.g., Gesell v. Martin, 463 P.

1969).

Hence, the 1959 quitclaim deed,

even if it was not the product of duress {see Point I above),
could not operate to di vest the Cooks of the mineral estate,
since their possession of only seven years fell far short of
the 25-year limitations period and so they had no interest i:
either the surface or subsurface estates which they could co:
.
. h
.
19 5 9 ' no sevc
If they could not convey the mineral
rig
ts in

. occurred at that time.
severance take place?
question.

So when, prior to 1952, d i· d the suPf'
The plaintiffs have not answer

Neither did the trial court.

ed thi5

Possibly they thout

urported ·
the severance occurred in 1950 when Aden Thornoc k P
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convey the larger part of the land to La_wrence Johnson.
But whether this is the case is a question of fact.

on its

face the deed recorded by the parties contained a reservation
of mineral rights to the

"grantee.~

The grantee being Johnson,

to whom the surface estate was likewise granted by the same
instrument, no severance took place since the full fee estate
purportedly passed to Johnson then.
However, even if "grantee" is held to mean "grantor" here
a matter better left to a jury to decide -- no severance took
place which is effective as against the Cooks, for several
reasons.

In the first place, only an effective deed will operate

to sever the mineral estate from the surface estate.

Thomas v.

Southwestern Settlement & Development Co., 132 Tex. 413, 123
S.W.2d 290,

300

(1939).

But Thornock's deed to Johnson was

ineffective to convey the surface to Johnson or reserve the
minerals to Thornock because neither estate was ever Thornock's
to convey, in other words, Thornock's title was defective.
Without reiterating the full rationale for this position, which
is set forth in the defendant's brief on appeal (at pages 3-4
and 12-13) and in her reply brief (pages 3-12), it suffices to
note by way of summary that there is an as-yet-unexplained break
in Thornock's chain of title, namely, there is no record of a
conveyance from Joseph E. Hatch & Co. to Joseph E. Hatch, who in
turn conveyed the land to Thornock's grantors, the four Hatch
daughters.

Absent any evidence--and none has been adduced--that

Joseph Hatch conveyed the land as agent of the corporation, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was merely the alter ego of Hatch whose independent existencE
should be disregarded, it necessarily follows that the land,
and a fortiori its minerals, were not Thornock' s to convey
in 1952 or any other time.

Nor does the record disclose any

conveyance by Ezra T. Hatch of his one-half interest in the
80-acre tract (N'2SE3i; of Sec. 24) which he and Joseph E. HaM.
had acquired from the State of Utah.

There is no showing th<:

authority had been granted to Joseph E. Hatch to convey the i:
terest in this tract owned by Ezra T. Hatch.

There had been

no severance of the minerals from the surface estate in this:
acres prior to the time the period of adverse possession by
Mrs. Cook had begwi to rwi.

(The principle that a party hasr

standing to challenge another's title on grounds which would
invalidate her own record title--invoked by this Court in its
prior opinion--is correct but is inapplicable here.

In disw.

ing Thornock' s record tit le Mrs. Cook is not breaking a link
in her own chain of title (namely, the conveyance from Thorno:
to her ostensible gr an tor Johnson) because she is not claimin:
pursuant to that chain of title:

Instead she claims title bi

adverse possession vis-a-vis the owner of record, apparently
still Joseph E. Hatch

& Co.)

Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon County,~
relied upon by the plaintiffs and also cited in the earlier
·
· not i'nconsi'stent wi'th this reasonin:
opinion
o f t h is Court, is
In that case the successor of the surface owner (not, as heti
. t le tO :
a claimant of the subsurface estate) sued to quiet ti
subsurface rights asserted by defendant county pursuan
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tax sale.

535 P.2d at 1139.

For purposes of passing on

a motion for summary judgment, the trial court assumed the
invalidity of the conveyance resulting from the tax sale.
535 P.2d at 1140.

This Court held that the tax sale was

effective to sever the surface from the subsurface estates.
535 P.2d at 1140.

This instant case does not involve a tax

sale and the plaintiffs here have not identified the transaction which they contend proves severance as a matter of law.
Kanawha & Hocking was not an ordinary adverse possession case;
it was decided, not under the usual limitations statute, but
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.2 (repl. vol.
1953).

535 P.2d at 1139-40.

Under that statute, "tax title"

refers to any title to real property, "whether valid or not,"
derived through or dependent upon a tax sale of the property.

U.C.A.

§

~aunty,

78-12-5.3; Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon
supra,

535 P.2d at 1140.

In Kanawha there was no doubt

as to which transaction effected a severance, and under the
applicable statute the validity vel non of the conveyance was
irrelevant to the effectiveness of the resulting severance.
Absent such a special statute, however, as previously noted, only
an effective deed results in severance of surface and mineral
estates.

Kanawha did not address that situation and is not

contrary to the general rule.
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That severance is pre-eminently an issue of fact,
unsuitable to summary disposition is apparent from Toth v
--------:_

Bigelow, 1 N.J. 399, 64 A.2d (1949), which involved an appEo
from the trial court's de.nial of a motion to dismiss an act:to quiet title.

The defendant-appellant, who conceded the

plaintiff's title to the surface, contended that his claim::
the mineral rights was nonetheless based upon a misinterpre:;
of certain deeds

in the plaintiff's chain of title, and tha:

actually there was a break in the chain of title.

He furU.s:

argued that, since there had been a prior severance of the
surface and mineral estates, the plaintiff's possession oft·
surface did not import possession of the minerals.

1N.J.1:

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the issues of inteW'
tation of the deeds and of severance pertained to the merits
the case and should be resolved at trial, not before:
We are met at the outset by the preliminary questio:
of whether it is necessary at this time to enter
into an examination and interpretation of the insw·
ments in the respective chains of title of all the
parties concerned.
Appellant urges us that it is
necessary to do so, his premise being based upon
argument that, a severance having occurred, a pr°F:;.
interpretation of the chains of title would sho 11 t''"
such severance has never been reunited. While this
.
could conceivably
be true we d o not d eem it necessar
. ~·
to consider the matter for we are of the opinion. ';:
.
. .
. e when tne ,.,.
this is
a matter for decision
at th e t im
is heard on the merits.
At that time the appel 1anc
0
fit 1a....
P resent evidence and argu!'lent that· it deems
d·
the ar .,.
opposition to respondent's case, inclu ing
·ti'
· s . of tti ~·
-based upon an interpretation o f t h e c h ain
We are of the opinion, however, that at this //tea
the suit it is neither necessary nor proper - 0
court to consider this argument.

t;;
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In its essential elements the question is
whether possession of the surface carries with
it possession of the minerals underneath it
in the face of an allegation of severance by
a prior common owner, neither party having
attempted to reduce the minerals in question
to possession. We are of the opinion that it
does.
While the precise question does not appear to have
been decided in this jurisdiction its answer flows
from well known and logical principles. At the
common law the rule was that ownership of the surface
imported ownership of an indefinite extent, upwards
and downwards.
[Citations omitted]***
This rebuttable presumption of the common law is
the rule in other jurisdictions as well as our own.
[Citation omitted.]***
The appellant will be afforded an opportunity to
rebut the presumption at the final hearing and if
it is proven that a severance does in fact exist
then the respondent's surface possession would not
extend to the minerals.
The appellant concedes the principle of the scope
of ownership but asserts that, by reason of the
alleged severance, it no longer applies. To be
sure, the ownership of subsurface rights, including
minerals, may be severed from the surface and
thereafter constitute a separate fee in another plane
of the same land and after such severance has been
effected a distinct and separate estate of inheritance exists therein. [Citations omitted]
And,although the question does not seem to have been
passed upon in New Jersey the great weight of
authority is to the effect that, when such severance
has been made, a possession of the surface d?es ~ot
constitute possession of the subsurface.
[Citations
omitted].
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~owever,

in the instant case the question
is not, as appellant would have it, whether
such a severance is valid, but whether it
exists at all and this cannot be determined
until a hearing on the merits.
1 N.J.

at 403-05.

(Emphasis added).

The rule of the Toth case is controlling here.

The ck

of severance, here as in Toth, presurnably reflects one party'
interpretation of the deeds in the chain of title.
is such a severance, possession of the surface
not constitute possession of the minerals.

If ther•

conceded~~

But severance is

a question of fact for the factfinder which is inappropriate
swnmary disposition.
Finally, even if the foregoing arguments were not decisi·
the law relating to severance is inapplicable on these facts
anyway.

A severance is effective only between the parties t:

the severance and those in privity with them.
Co., 273

s.w.

993,

1005

Clements v:_]_,

(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1925).

The Coor:

were not parties to the Thornock/Johnson transaction and,
their color of title,

t;,i

for purposes of adverse possession, ce:

from Johnson, actually they could never have been in privit'
with Johnson vis-a-vis this property because Johnson, like:.
grantor Thornock, was without title to the land.

Mrs. cook''

claim of title to the land with its subsurface rights depen:'
not upon record title but rather upon her adverse possessof the property as against its true owner.

Whether the e-·
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of adverse possession can be shown to exist in these circumstances is, of course, a question of fact for the jury at
trial.

But it is at least clear that the plaintiffs have made

no serious effort to show that no genuine issue of material fact
exists as to the adverse possession issue, or that the plaintiffs
are entitled to judgment as to that issue as a matter of law.
Insofar as this Court in its previous opinion relied- upon the
severance allegation, it had no occasion to pass upon the
question whether the elements of adverse possession may be shown.
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CONCLUSION
It merits reiteration that the issues before the Court,
in the present posture of the case, are very narrow.
Essentially, the question is whether the plaintiffs as mov::.:
party have articulated grounds and identified record evidencestablishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact
to either the duress or the adverse possession issues
further,

a~,

that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.

For present purposes, the defendant asserts

that such issues do,

indeed, exist.

The issue is not whethi:

the Court finds the defendant's case to be particularly pm.
sive; the only issue is whether the defendant is to be allw
to present and develop her case at all to a jury of her pei::
Under the established standard of review of summary judgme::
the Court should reverse and remand, with the understandin·;·
such a disposition is by no means an endorsement of the mer:
of the defendant's case or a prediction as to the likely ou::
at trial.

These other considerations are simply beside t~

point at this stage in the proceedings.

It is enough to F

reversal of the trial court that either there are triable

li'

of material fact as to the duress and adverse possession;;,.
or else that, whether or not there truly are such issues,:::
urden of sho1·:ii:
plaintiffs have not discharged their heavy b
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the non-existence of such issues.
For these reasons, appellant, prays the honorable Court
to set aside the surrunary judgment below, together with the
decree of quiet title, and to remand the entire matter for
a trial on the merits in the District Court.

Respectively submitted,

Attorney for Appellant
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